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FEDERAL FUNDS: INSTRUMENT OF
FEDERAL RESERVE POLICY
Marvin Goodfriend and William Whelpley
Federal funds are the heart of the money market
in the sense that they are the core of the overnight
market for credit in the United States. Moreover,
current and expected future interest rates on Federal
funds are the basic rates to which all other money
market rates are anchored. Understanding the Fed-
eral funds market requires, above all, recognizing that
its general character has been shaped by Federal Re-
serve policy. From the beginning, Federal Reserve
regulatory rulings have encouraged the market’s
growth. Equally important, the Federal funds rate
has been a key monetary policy instrument. This
article explains Federal funds as a credit instrument,
the funds rate as an instrument of monetary policy,
and the funds market itself as an instrument of regu-
latory policy. 
Characteristics of Federal Funds
Federal funds have three distinguishing features.
First, they are short-term borrowings of immediately
available money-funds which can be transferred
between depository institutions within a single busi-
ness day. The vast majority, roughly 80 percent, of
Federal funds are overnight borrowings. The re-
mainder are longer maturity borrowings known as
term Federal funds. Second, Federal funds are lia-
bilities of those depository institutions required to
hold reserves with Federal Reserve Banks as defined
by the Monetary Control Act of 1980. They are:
commercial banks, savings banks, savings and loan
associations, and credit unions. Third, historically
Federal funds borrowed have been distinguished from
other depository institution liabilities because they
have been exempt from both reserve requirements
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and interest rate ceilings.
1 Depository institutions are
also the most important eligible lenders in the market.
The Federal Reserve, however, also allows depository
institutions to classify borrowings from Federal agen-
cies and nonbank securities dealers as Federal funds.
2
The supply and demand for Federal funds arises in
large part as a means of efficiently distributing re-
serves throughout the banking system. On any given
day, individual depository institutions may be either
above or below their desired reserve position. Re-
serve accounts bear no interest, so banks have an
incentive to lend reserves beyond those required plus
any desired excess. Banks in need of reserves bor-
row them. The borrowing and lending of reserves
takes place in the Federal funds market at a com-
petitively determined interest rate known as the
Federal funds rate.
The Federal funds market also functions as the
core of a more extensive overnight market for credit
free of reserve requirements and interest rate con-
trols. Nonbank depositors supply funds to the over-
night market through repurchase agreements (RPs)
with their banks. The overnight repurchase agree-
ment is a collateralized one-day loan, which requires
actual transfer of title on the loan collateral. Under
an overnight repurchase agreement, a depositor lends
1 This distinction has been blurred since passage of the
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act of 1980. Reserve requirements have been elimi-
nated on some personal time deposits and interest rate
controls have been removed on all liabilities except tradi-
tional demand deposits. However, interbank deposits are
still reservable and explicit interest is still prohibited on
interbank demand deposits.
In addition, our definition should be qualified because
Repurchase Agreements (RPs) at banks have not had
interest rate ceilings or reserve requirements. Strictly
speaking. RPs are not Federal funds. Yet as we explain
below, Their growth and use have had much in common
with the Federal funds market. And the point of view of
this article is that they are close functional equivalents.
2 A more complete list of eligible lenders is found in
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin 56 (January 1970), p. 38.
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bank repurchases the next day at a price agreed to in
advance. Overnight RPs account for about 25 per-
cent of overnight borrowings by large commercial
banks. Banks use RPs to acquire funds free of re-
serve requirements and interest controls from sources,
such as corporations and state and local governments,
not eligible to lend Federal funds directly. Total
daily average gross RP and Federal funds borrowings
by large commercial banks are roughly 200 billion
dollars, of which approximately 130 billion dollars are
Federal funds. Competition for funds among banks
ties the RP rate closely to the Federal funds rate.
Normally, the RP rate is around 25 basis points
below the Federal funds rate; the lower rate being
due to the reduced risk and additional transaction
cost of arranging an RP.
Methods of Federal Funds Exchange
Federal funds transactions can be initiated by
either the lender or borrower. An institution wishing
to sell (loan) Federal funds locates a buyer (bor-
rower) directly through an existing banking relation-
ship or indirectly through a Federal funds broker.
Federal funds brokers maintain frequent telephone
contact with active funds market participants and
match purchase and sale orders in return for a com-
mission. Normally, competition among participants
ensures that a single funds rate prevails throughout
the market. However, the rate might be tiered,
higher for a bank under financial stress. Moreover,
banks believed to be particularly poor credit risks
may be unable to borrow Federal funds at all.
Two methods of Federal funds transfer are com-
monly used. The first involves transfers conducted
between two banks. To execute a transaction, the
lending institution authorizes the district Reserve
Bank to debit its reserve account and to credit the
reserve account of the borrowing institution. Fed-
wire, the Federal Reserve System’s wire transfer
network, is employed to complete a transfer.
The second method simply involves reclassifying
respondent bank demand deposits at correspondent
banks as Federal funds borrowed. Here, the entire
transaction takes place on the books of the corre-
spondent. To initiate a Federal funds sale, the re-
spondent bank simply notifies the correspondent of
its intentions. The correspondent purchases funds
from the respondent by reclassifying the respondent’s
demand deposits as “Federal funds purchased.” The
respondent does not have access to its deposited
money as long as it is classified as Federal funds on
the books of the correspondent. Upon maturity of
the loan, the respondent’s demand deposit account is
credited for the total value of the loan, plus an
interest payment for use of the funds. The interest
rate paid to the respondent is usually based on the
nationwide effective Federal funds rate for the day.
In practice, the correspondent frequently resells the
reclassified funds in the Federal funds market itself,
earning the Federal funds rate in the process.
Types of Federal Funds Instruments
The most common type of Federal funds instru-
ment is an overnight, unsecured loan between two
financial institutions. Overnight loans are, for the
most part, booked without a formal, written contract.
Banks exchange verbal agreements based on any
number of considerations, including how well the
corresponding officers know each other and how long
the banks have mutually done business. Brokers
play an important role evaluating the quality of a loan
when no previous arrangement exists. Formal con-
tracting would slow the process and increase trans-
action costs. The verbal agreement as security is
virtually unique to Federal funds.
In some cases Federal funds transactions are ex-
plicitly secured. In a secured transaction the pur-
chaser places government securities in a custody
account for the seller as collateral to support the loan.
The purchaser, however, retains title to the securities.
Upon termination of the contract, custody of the
securities is returned to the owner. Secured Federal
funds transactions are sometimes requested by the
lending institution.
Continuing contract Federal funds are overnight
Federal funds loans which are automatically renewed
unless terminated by either the lender or borrower.
This type of arrangement is typically employed by
correspondents who purchase overnight Federal
funds from a respondent bank. Unless notified by
the respondent to the contrary, the correspondent will
continually roll the interbank deposit into Federal
funds, creating a longer term instrument of open
maturity. The interest payments on continuing con-
tract Federal funds loans are computed from a
formula based on each day’s effective Federal funds
rate. When a continuing contract arrangement is
made, the transactions costs (primarily brokers fees
and funds transfer charges) of doing business are
minimized because the entire transaction is completed
on the books of the correspondent bank. In fact,
additional costs are incurred only when the agree-
ment is terminated by either party.
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To explain the determinants of the Federal funds
rate, we present a simple model of the bank reserve
market which incorporates the actions of both private
banks and the Federal Reserve.
3 In this model, the
funds rate is competitively determined as that value
which equilibrates the aggregate supply and demand
for banking system reserves.
The aggregate demand for bank reserves arises
primarily from the public’s demand for checkable
deposits against which banks hold reserves. The
aggregate quantity of checkable deposits demanded
by the public falls as money market interest rates
rise, raising the opportunity cost of holding checkable
deposits. Hence, the derived demand for bank re-
serves is negatively related to market interest rates.
The aggregate demand schedule for bank reserves is
shown in Figure 1, where f is the funds rate and R
is aggregate bank reserves.
The aggregate stock of reserves available to the
banking system is determined by the Federal Reserve.
In principle, the Federal Reserve could choose to
provide the banking system with a fixed stock of
reserves. If the Federal Reserve chose this strat-
egy, a fixed stock of reserves, R, would be provided
through Federal Reserve purchases of government
securities. The resulting funds rate would be f* in
Figure 1, or the rate which equilibrates the aggregate
supply and demand for bank reserves.
Such a Federal Reserve operating procedure,
known as total reserve targeting, is the focus of
hypothetical textbook discussions of monetary policy.
The hallmark of total reserve targeting is that shifts
in the market’s demand for reserves are allowed to
directly affect the funds rate. In practice, however,
the Federal Reserve has never targeted total reserves.
Instead, it has adopted operating procedures designed
to smooth funds rate movements against unexpected
reserve demand shifts.
4 The simplest smoothing
procedure is Federal funds rate targeting, which in-
volves selecting a narrow band, often fifty basis
points or less, within which the funds rate is allowed
to fluctuate. Explicit Federal funds rate targeting
was employed by the Federal Reserve during the
1970s.
Figure 1
3 Goodfriend [1982], pp. 3-16.
4 Goodfriend [1986]. contains a theoretical rational ex-
pectations model of interest rate smoothing and discusses
its implications for money stock and price level trend-
stationarity.
The funds rate can be targeted directly by supply-
ing, through open market purchases of U. S. Trea-
sury securities, whatever aggregate reserves are de-
manded at the targeted rate. For example, if the
Federal Reserve chose to peg the funds rate at f* in
Figure 1, it would have to accommodate a market
demand for reserves of R In principle, either total
reserve or funds rate targeting could yield the ex ante
desired funds rate, f*, so long as the Federal Reserve
had precise knowledge of the position of the reserve
demand locus. There is, however, an important
difference between these procedures. With a total
reserve target, market forces directly influence the
funds rate. They have no direct effect under a funds
rate target. Instead, they affect the volume of total
reserves.
Federal Reserve operating procedures become
more complicated when reserves are provided by
bank borrowing at the Federal Reserve discount
window. Figure 2 shows the relationship between
reserve provision and the Federal funds rate when
there is discount window borrowing. The locus has a
vertical and a nonvertical segment because reserves
are provided to the banking system in two forms, as
nonborrowed and as borrowed reserves. Nonbor-
rowed reserves (NBR) are supplied by the Federal
Reserve through open market purchases, while bor-
rowed reserves (BR) are provided by discount win-
dow borrowing.
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The distance between the vertical segment of the
reserve provision locus and the vertical axis is deter-
mined by the volume of nonborrowed reserves. The
reserve provision locus is vertical up to the point
where the funds rate (f) equals the discount rate (d)
because when the funds rate is below the discount
rate, banks have no incentive to borrow at the dis-
count window. Conversely, when the funds rate is
above the discount rate borrowers obtain a net saving
on the explicit interest cost of reserves. This net
saving consists of the differential (f-d) between the
funds rate and the discount rate. In administering
the discount window the Federal Reserve imposes a
noninterest cost of borrowing which rises with vol-
ume. In practice, higher borrowing increases the
likelihood of triggering costly Federal Reserve con-
sultations with bank officials, Banks tend to borrow
up to the point where the marginal expected non-
interest cost of borrowing just offsets the net interest
saving. Consequently, borrowing tends to be greater
the larger the spread between the funds rate and the
discount rate. Hence, the reserve provision locus is
positively sloped for funds rates above the discount
rate.
Discount window borrowing plays a role in deter-
mining the funds rate whenever the Federal Reserve
restricts the supply of nonborrowed reserves so that
the funds rate exceeds the discount rate. In that
case, the banking system’s demand for reserves is
partially satisfied by borrowing at the discount win-
dow. If the Federal Reserve chooses to keep non-
borrowed reserves fixed in response to an unexpected
shift in either reserve demand or the demand for dis-
count window borrowing, then the procedure is called
nonborrowed reserve targeting. Nonborrowed re-
serve targeting is a kind of cross between funds rate
and total reserve targeting in the sense that the
reserve provision locus is diagonal, rather than hori-
zontal or vertical, thereby partially smoothing the
funds rate against aggregate reserve demand shifts.
The Federal Reserve employed nonborrowed reserve
targeting between October 1979 and the fall of 1952.
By contrast, the Federal Reserve may choose to
respond to a shift in reserve demand or the demand
for discount window borrowing by adjusting the
provision of nonborrowed reserves to keep aggregate
discount window borrowing unchanged. The latter
procedure, known as borrowed reserve targeting, is
closely related to funds rate targeting. This is be-
cause, for a given level of the discount rate, targeting
borrowed reserves determines the funds rate except
for unpredictable instability due to shifts in the de-
mand for discount window borrowing. Borrowed
reserve targeting has been the predominant operating
procedure since late 1982. An analytically similar
procedure, known as free reserve targeting, was em-
ployed throughout the 1920s and in the 1950s and
’60s.
5
As can be seen in Figure 2, Federal Reserve dis-
count rate policy plays an important role in deter-
mining the funds rate when f is greater than d under
either nonborrowed or borrowed reserve targeting.
As is easily verified diagrammatically, with a bor-
rowed reserve target a discount rate adjustment
changes the funds rate one-for-one. The effect is
smaller with nonborrowed reserve targeting. Keep
in mind, however, that the discount rate would be
irrelevant for determination of the funds rate if the
Federal Reserve were to supply a stock of nonbor-
rowed reserves sufficiently large so that the funds rate
fell below the discount rate, and banks had no in-
centive to borrow at the discount window. It is also
irrelevant when the Federal Reserve targets the funds
rate directly. Discount rate adjustments have played
an important role since October 1979 in both the
nonborrowed and borrowed reserve targeting periods,
as they did in the 1920s, ’50s and ’60s under free
5 Free reserves are defined as excess reserves minus
borrowed reserves, or equivalently nonborrowed reserves
minus required reserves. Net borrowed reserves are
negative free reserves.
6 ECONOMIC REVIEW, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1986reserve targeting. In contrast, discount rate adjust-
ments had no direct impact on the funds rate when
the funds rate itself was targeted during the 1970s.
In that period, however, the announcement effect
associated with discount rate changes sometimes
signaled Federal Reserve intentions to change the
funds rate target in the future.
The Federal Reserve, the Federal Funds
Rate, and Money Market Rates
The Federal Reserve’s operating procedures in the
reserve market have varied greatly over the years.
As we have seen, however, the Federal Reserve has
always exercised a dominant influence on the deter-
mination of the Federal funds rate through setting the
terms upon which it makes nonborrowed and bor-
rowed reserves available to the banking system.
The funds rate is the base rate to which other
money market rates are anchored. Market partici-
pants determine money market rates according to
their view of current and expected future Federal
funds rates. In practice, because Federal Reserve
monetary policy smooths funds rate movements, such
views depend heavily on anticipated Federal Reserve
policy intentions. As an example, consider bank
certificates of deposit (CDs), which are generally
arranged for a few months. CD rates, adjusted for
reserve requirements, are roughly aligned with an
average of expected future funds rates over the term
of the CD. Banks can raise funds either through
CDs or Federal funds and therefore choose whichever
option is expected to be cheaper. Likewise, corpora-
tions considering a Treasury bill purchase have the
option of lending their funds daily over the term of
the bill at the overnight repurchase rate, which is
closely tied to the Federal funds rate. As shown in
Chart 1, arbitrage such as described above among
alternative money market instruments generally keeps
their yields in line, abstracting from differences due
to interest rate spreads resulting from transaction
costs and risk differentials.
Such considerations on the part of market partici-
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FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMONDReserve policy toward the Federal funds rate the key
determinant of money market rates in general.
Having made this point, we must realize that it pro-
vides only a partial explanation of money market
rates. A full explanation requires an understanding
of Federal Reserve monetary policy. In particular,
economy-wide variables such as unemployment and
inflation do ultimately play an important role in the
evolution of the funds rate through their effect on
the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy actions over
time.
History of the Federal Funds Market
The birth of widespread trading in Federal funds
is roughly pinpointed by a New York Herald Tribune
article appearing in April 1928.
6 That article de-
scribed the growing importance of Federal funds
trading in the money market, reporting a typical daily
volume of $100 million.
7 The primary purpose of
the article was to announce the inclusion of the Fed-
eral funds rate in the Tribune’s daily table of money
market conditions.
As the Tribune described it, Federal funds trans-
actions involved the exchange of a check drawn on
the clearing house account of the borrowing bank
for a check drawn on the reserve account of the
lending bank. The reserve check cleared immediately
upon presentation at the Reserve Bank, while the
clearinghouse check took at least one day to clear.
The practice thereby yielded a self-reversing, over-
night loan of funds at a Reserve Bank; hence the
name, Federal funds. By 1930, the means of trading
Federal funds had expanded to include book-entry
and wire transfer methods.
8
The emergence of Federal funds trading consti-
tuted a financial innovation allowing banks to mini-
mize transactions costs associated with overnight
loans. By their very nature, Federal funds could be
lent by member banks only, since only member banks
held reserves at Reserve Banks. The beneficiaries on
the borrowing side were also member banks, which
could receive funds immediately through their Re-
serve Bank accounts. Federal funds offered member
banks a means of avoiding reserve requirements on
interbank deposits if they could be classified as
“money borrowed” rather than deposits.
6 New York Herald Tribune [1928].
7 Willis [1970], p. 12, contains evidence of market ac-
tivity as far back as 1922.
8 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin 16 (February 1930), p. 81.
In September 1928 the Federal Reserve Board
ruled that Federal funds should be classified as non-
reservable money borrowed.
9 A further decision in
1930 found that Federal funds created by book-entry
and wire transfer methods should also be nonreserv-
able. These decisions provided the initial regulatory
underpinnings for the Federal funds market of today.
In both the 1925 and 1930 rulings, the Board indi-
cated that it viewed Federal funds as a substitute for
member bank borrowing at the Federal Reserve dis-
count window. It argued that because discount win-
dow borrowing was not reservable, Federal funds
borrowing should not be either. This view seemed
appropriate because the mechanics of a Federal funds
transaction restricted participation in the Federal
funds market to member banks alone.
The Federal Reserve Board’s decision to make
Federal funds nonreservable is best understood as a
means of encouraging the Federal funds market as an
alternative to the two conventional means of reserve
adjustment then in use : the discount window and the
call loan market. Following World War I, aggregate
Federal Reserve discount window borrowing gener-
ally exceeded member bank reserves. There was
relatively little Federal Reserve discouragement of
continuous borrowing at the window. Member banks
could adjust their reserve positions directly with the
Federal Reserve by running discount window bor-
rowing up or down. In addition, banks had a highly
effective means of reserve adjustment in the call loan
market. Since the middle of the nineteenth century,
banks had made a significant fraction of their loans
to stockbrokers, secured by stock or bond collateral
on a continuing contract, overnight basis.
10 A bank
could obtain reserves on demand by calling in its
broker loans, and it could readily lend excess
reserves by increasing its supply of call loans. The
call loan market was the functional equivalent of the
Federal funds market for reserve adjustment pur-
poses.
By 1928, however, the Federal Reserve had begun
discouraging both the discount window and the call
loan market as a means of reserve adjustment. Since
1922, substantial open market purchases had reduced
borrowed reserves to less than one-third of total re-
serves.
11 Moreover, in an apparent effort to further
9 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin 14 (September 1928), p. 656.
10 See chapters 7 and 13 in Myers [1931].
11 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941, pp. 368-96.
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appeared to receive at the window, the Federal Re-
serve began actively discouraging continuous discount
borrowing by individual banks
12 Both policy actions
tended to make discount window borrowing less
effective for routine reserve adjustment purposes.
This was particularly true for banks with unde-
sired reserves, because with borrowing usually low
or zero, they could not dispose of reserves by running
down borrowings from the discount window. In
addition, the Federal Reserve came to see the call
loan market as an inappropriate means of financing
security speculation during the stock market boom of
the late 1920s. It went so far as to bring “direct
pressure” on individual banks to restrict call loans.
13
Apart from providing a substitute for the discount
window and call loans, Federal funds helped to offset
the increased cost of membership due to the more
restrictive discount policy and the discouragement of
call lending. Membership in the Federal Reserve
System is voluntary, and throughout most of its his-
tory the Federal Reserve has been concerned about
membership attrition. One of the significant costs of
membership was the requirement that banks hold
more non-interest-bearing reserves than nonmember
banks had to hold. In making Federal funds nonre-
servable, the Federal Reserve reduced a cost of mem-
bership by providing member banks a means of more
effectively competing for overnight interbank de-
posits.
Banking legislation in the 1930s further enhanced
the attractiveness of Federal funds by enabling banks
to continue to pay market interest on overnight inter-
bank balances even after the Banking Act of 1933
prohibited explicit interest on demand deposits. This
benefit was to prove particularly important in the
high interest rate environment of the 1960s and ’70s.
In order to prevent excessive use of stock market
credit, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 au-
thorized the Federal Reserve Board to set margin
requirements for both brokers and banks, and others
if necessary, on loans collateralized by listed stocks
and bonds. Relatively high margin requirements,
coupled with other restrictions, brought about a per-
manent decline in the call loan market.
14
l2 Fifteenth Annual Report of the Federal Reserve Board
Covering Operations for the Year 1928 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1929), pp. 7-10.
l3 See the discussion in Friedman and Schwartz [1963],
pp. 254-66.
14 The historical margin requirement series is reported
in Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Banking and Monetary Statistics.
Extremely low interest rates in the 1930s greatly
reduced the interest opportunity cost of holding ex-
cess reserves. Consequently, banks held a large
volume of excess reserves during this period and
Federal funds trading virtually disappeared. Federal
Reserve pegging of Treasury bill rates between 1942
and 1947 rendered the funds market superfluous for
reserve adjustment purposes. Under this policy the
Federal Reserve freely converted Treasury securities
into reserves at a fixed price. Therefore, banks could
use their inventory of Treasury bills for reserve ad-
justment purposes just as they had used their dis-
count window borrowings in the early 1920s. The
Federal Reserve abandoned its Treasury bill price
peg in 1947 and Federal funds trading gradually re-
emerged as the most efficient means of reserve ad-
justment. Furthermore, higher market interest rates
prevailing in the 1950s increased the opportunity cost
of holding excess reserves, making more frequent re-
serve adjustment: desirable. Consequently, the volume
of trading in Federal funds grew sharply, with daily
average gross purchases of large reserve city banks
reaching about $800 million by the end of 1959.
15
In the 1960s, the Federal funds market began to
take on a broader role beyond that of reserve adjust-
ment borrowing. Banks made more extensive use of
Federal funds as a means of avoiding the reserve
requirement tax and the interest prohibition on de-
mand deposits, both of which became more burden-
some as inflation and interest rates rose throughout
the period. Although the Federal Reserve was
responsible for enforcing both of these legislative
restrictions, it had to be concerned throughout this
period with offsetting the increased burden of mem-
bership in the System, and its actions during the
period reflected this concern.
16
The Board’s first significant ruling with regard to
the Federal funds market in this period was made in
1964 when it decided that a respondent bank, whether
member or not, could request a correspondent mem-
ber bank to simply reclassify a deposit as Federal
funds, instead of having to transfer Federal funds
through a Reserve Bank account.
17 This ruling
probably had its major effect on smaller respondent
15 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin 50 (August 1964), p. 954.
16 Goodfriend and Hargraves [1983] document in detail
how the membership problem dominated reserve require-
ment reform throughout this period.
17 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Federal Reserve Bulletin 50 (August 1964), pp. 1000-
1001.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND 9banks, who had previously found use of Federal funds
too costly for the size of their transactions. Allowing
banks to simply reclassify their correspondent bal-
ances as Federal funds enabled smaller institutions
to benefit from Federal funds, as large banks had
already been doing. Moreover, it allowed Federal
Reserve member correspondent banks to compete
more effectively for interbank funds, thereby reduc-
ing a disincentive to membership. In 1986, for
example, aggregate interbank reservable deposits at
large commercial banks are only 25 to 30 percent of
aggregate Federal funds borrowings.
Banks in the 1960s also had increasing incentive
to give their nonbank depositors access to nonreserv-
able, market interest-paying overnight loans. Non-
banks had always been prohibited from participating
in the Federal funds market. But during the 1960s
widespread use of overnight repurchase agreements
(RPs) by banks became popular as a means of allow-
ing their nonbank depositors to earn an overnight
rate only slightly below the Federal funds rate. As
mentioned earlier, the lower rate is due to the reduced
risk and additional transaction cost of arranging an
RP. RPs do not allow nonbanks to lend Federal
funds proper. Because RPs allow nonbanks to ap-
proximately earn the Federal funds rate, however, the
RP market together with the Federal funds market
constitutes a unified overnight loan market.
Obviously, nonbank depositors did not need access
to a relatively unregulated overnight rate for reserve
adjustment purposes. But the need to facilitate
reserve adjustment had been the rationale for waiving
reserve requirements and interest rate controls on
Federal funds. Nevertheless, the Federal Reserve
chose not to make RPs at banks subject to reserve
requirements or interest rate controls, probably be-
cause doing so would have worsened the competitive
position of member banks relative to nonmembers
and increased membership attrition.
It was necessary, however, to face up to two conse-
quences of allowing widespread use of RPs at banks.
First, RPs were not covered by deposit insurance.
Second, shifts from deposits to RPs reduced the re-
serve requirement tax base and consequently cost the
U. S. Treasury tax revenue. A 1969 Federal Reserve
rule restricting eligible bank RP collateral to direct
obligations of the United States or its agencies, e.g.,
Treasury bills, responded to those concerns. In
principal, requiring RPs to be collateralized with
liabilities of the United States made them free of
default risk.
18 In addition, restricting bank RP paper
exclusively to U. S. liabilities may have enhanced the
demand for U. S. debt, offsetting somewhat the loss
of reserve requirement tax revenue.
A 1970 Board ruling formally clarified eligibility
for participation on the lending side of the Federal
funds market. Eligibility was restricted to commer-
cial banks whether member or nonmember, savings
banks, savings and loan associations, and others.
19
In effect, the ruling explicitly segmented the over-
night bank loan market into two classes of institu-
tions, those that could lend Federal funds, and those
that were required to pay somewhat more substantial
transactions costs, through RPs, to earn a rate on
overnight loans free of reserve requirements and
interest rate controls. Because RPs were uneco-
nomical in smaller volumes, smaller firms and house-
holds were unable to obtain nonreservable market
yields on overnight money until the emergence of
money market mutual funds in the late 1970s.
Conclusion
It is interesting to note how far the Federal funds
market has come from its beginnings in the 1920s.
Initially, the regulatory rationale for making Federal
funds nonreservable was to provide member banks
with a substitute for the discount window and call
loans for reserve adjustment purposes. Participation
in the Federal funds market was limited to member
banks, i.e., banks holding required reserves at Re-
serve Banks. By the 1970s, however, that initial
participation principle was effectively overturned.
Nonbanks  were not allowed to participate directly in
the Federal funds market, but they were allowed to
earn approximately the Federal funds rate through
RPs at banks. Reserve adjustment obviously no
longer provided a rationale for sanctioning access to
an overnight loan rate free of reserve requirements
and interest rate controls. Rather, the granting of
such access is better explained as a means by which,
in order to minimize membership attrition, the Fed-
18 Even if collateralized by U. S. government secuirties,
as a legal matter RPs might also be subject to custodial
risk due to incompletely specified contracts. See Ring-
smuth [1985].
19 See footnote 2.
10 ECONOMIC REVIEW, SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1986era1 Reserve allowed member banks and their cus-
tomers to avoid the reserve requirement tax and
interest rate prohibition on overnight loans.
The Federal funds market today is in many ways a
functional equivalent of the call loan market of the
1920s and earlier. The most notable differences are
that the nonbank portion of the market is now a net
lender rather than a net borrower, and the collateral
used is exclusively debt of the United States govern-
ment and its agencies rather than private stocks and
bonds. Like the old call loan market, the Federal
funds market of today facilitates the distribution of
reserves among banks, and has much wider partici-
pation and a more general role as the core of an over-
night credit market unencumbered by reserve require-
ments and legal restrictions on interest rates.
References
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Annual Report of the Board of Governors, various
editions.
“Interest Rate Smoothing and Price Level
Trend-Stationarity.” Federal Reserve Bank of
Richmond, July 1986.
Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-
1941. Washington: Board of Governors, 1943.
Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1941-
1970. Washington: Board of Governors, 1976.
The Federal Funds Market-A Study by a
Federal Reserve System Committee. Washington:
Board of Governors, 1959.
. Federal Reserve Bulletin, various issues.
“Federal Funds’ Rate Index of Credit Status.” New
York Herald Tribune, April 5, 1928.
Friedman, Milton, and Anna J. Schwartz. A Monetary
History of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963.
Goodfriend, Marvin. “A Model of Money Stock Deter-
mination with Loan Demand and a Banking System
Balance Sheet Constraint.” Federal Reserve Bank
of Richmond, Economic Review 68 (January/Feb-
ruary 1982), pp. 3-16.
Goodfriend, Marvin, and Monica Hargarves. “A His-
torical Assessment of the Rationales and Functions
of Reserve Requirements.” Federal Reserve Bank




The New York Money Market,
New York: Columbia University Press,
1931.
Ringsmuth, Don. “Custodial Arrangements and Other
Contractual Considerations.” Federal Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, Economic Review 70 (September
1985), pp. 40-48.
Turner, Bernice C. The Federal Fund Market. New
York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1931.
Willis, Parker B. The Federal Funds Market: Its
Origin and Development. Boston : Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston, 1970.
INSTRUMENTS OF THE MONEY MARKET
Sixth Edition
The Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond is pleased to announce the publication
of the sixth edition of Instruments of the Money Market. This completely new
edition contains articles on the following subjects: Federal funds, the discount
window, large certificates of deposit, Eurodollars, repurchase and reverse repurchase
agreements, Treasury bills, short-term municipal securities, commercial paper,
bankers acceptances, the federally sponsored credit agencies, money market mutual
funds and other short-term investment pools, short-term interest rate futures, and
options on short-term interest rate futures.
Single copies are available free of charge. For additional copies, there will be a
charge of $1.00 each, except for orders from educational institutions, including
libraries. Payment, if applicable, is required in advance by check or money order in
U. S. dollars to the Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond. Copies can be obtained by
writing to the Public Services Department, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond,
P. O. Box 27622, Richmond, Virginia 23261.
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